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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Paul G. Beers*
The focus of this article is upon employment law in Virginia
during 1993 and the first half of 1994.' In addition, significant
judicial decisions from 1992 are covered. Workers' compensation
and unemployment compensation are excluded as topics. Public
sector employment law also lies outside the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, two decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia
which involve public employees are analyzed. The most turbu-
lent and rapidly evolving area of Virginia employment law lies
in tort. The decisions discussed below indicate that employees
stand only a modest chance of recovering against their employ-
ers in wrongful discharge suits based on implied contract or
promissory estoppel theories. Recently, however, employees have
made notable gains in the Supreme Court of Virginia, as new
* Member, Glenn, Flippin, Feldmann and Darby, Roanoke, Virginia. B-., 1980,
Trinity College; M.IA, 1983, Columbia University School of International Affairs;
J.D., 1986, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. The article discusses only judicial developments. The 1994 session of the Vir-
ginia General Assembly produced little significant legislation in the field of employ-
ment relations. Two legislative enactments in 1994, both of which concern garnish-
ment, are relevant here. The General Assembly amended and reenacted §§ 8.01-512.3
and 8.01-512.4 of the Code of Virginia to require that the statutory garnishment
notice issued to the debtor reveal the creditor's telephone number and the name,
address and telephone number of the creditor's lawyer. This new legislation also adds
certain retirement benefits under section 34-34 of the Code of Virginia to the list of
garnishment exemptions debtors may select. Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 40, 1994 Va.
Acts 113 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-512.3, -512.4 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). In
another legislative change, the General Assembly amended and reenacted section 8.01-
512.2 of the Code of Virginia to allow all employers to charge a $10.00 fee for pro-
cessing garnishments. Previously, only employers with more than 10,000 employees
could charge this fee. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 664, 1994 Va. Acts 967 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). One other legislative enactment in
1994 is notable. The General Assembly adopted a new statute prohibiting any law
enforcement agency from requiring employees to submit to a lie detector rest or dis-
criminating against employees who refuse to take those examinations. Act of Apr. 9,
1994, ch. 561, 1994 Va. Acts 787 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.4:4 (Cur.
Supp. 1994)).
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decisions have expanded their right to recover against employ-
ers in tort for unjust dismissal and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. On the other hand, employers have had
resounding success as plaintiffs, suing former employees in tort
for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with
contractual relations.
I. ACTIONS AGAINST EMPLOYERS
A. At-Will Contracts of Employment
The "at-will" rule, which raises a strong presumption that all
employment is terminable without cause, is alive in Virginia.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
breach of contract actions brought by discharged employees,
confirm the rule's vitality in Virginia. Decided in September,
1992 by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Progress Printing Co.,
Inc. v. Nichols2 underscored the challenges discharged employ-
ees face in seeking to overcome the "at-will" rule. As a result of
the interplay between the Virginia Supreme Court's traditional
adherence to the employment "at-will" rule in Progress Printing
and the court's unconventional application of the statute of
frauds in decisions such as Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank,'
employers may easily avoid becoming contractually bound by
promises of job security contained in their personnel manuals.
In Progress Printing, the employer gave its employee, Nichols,
a personnel handbook on his first day at work. The manual
provided that the employer would not discharge or suspend any
employee "without just cause and shall give at least one warn-
ing notice ... in writing."4 Another section of the manual
stated that employees must serve a thirty-day probationary
period.5 The manual failed to specify whether probationary
personnel were at-will employees. Thirteen days later, the em-
ployer obtained Nichols' signature on an acknowledgment form
2. 244 Va. 337, 421 S.E.2d 428 (1992).
3. 245 Va. 395, 428 S.E.2d 916 (1993).
4. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 339, 421 S.E.2d at 429.
5. Id. at 342, 421 S.E.2d at 430-31.
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stating that the employment relationship was "at-will and may
be terminated by either party at any time."6
Progress Printing fired Nichols two years later without a
written warning. Nichols sued his former employer, claiming
that Progress Printing breached the employee handbook by
discharging him without warning or cause. Progress Printing
argued that the written disclaimer rendered Nichols an at-will
worker and superseded contrary language in the handbook
Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Campbell Coun-
ty awarded Nichols damages. The trial court harmonized the
conflicting documents, finding that the disclaimer merely
clarified Nichols' status as an at-will employee during his thir-
ty-day probationary period. According to the court, Progress
Printing had breached the parties' contract by discharging
Nichols without cause or the written warning promised in the
handbook.8
In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Virginia
initially analyzed the issues by reiterating familiar principles
and enunciating new ones. Citing its own precedent, the court
confirmed that an employee may rebut the at-will presumption
in at least two ways: by proving that the employer has agreed
to retain him or her for a fixed period of time, or by establish-
ing that the employer agreed unambiguously to fire the employ-
ee only for just cause.' In either case, the promise of continued
6. Id. at 339, 421 S.E.2d at 429.
7. Nichols v. Progress Printing Co., 24 Va. Cir. 301, 303 (Campbell County
1991). Nichols also sued his former employer for violating the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991). The circuit court held
for the employer on this issue, which was affrmed on cross-appeal to the supreme
court. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 343, 421 S.E.2d at 431.
8. Nichols, 24 Va. Cir. at 304.
9. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 340-41, 421 S.E.2d at 429-30. A contract termi-
nable only for just cause is the equivalent of an agreement of fixed duration. Miller
v. SEVAMP, Inc. 234 Va. 462, 466, 362 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1987). In addition to recog-
nizing these two common methods of rebuttal, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
held that consideration exists for a binding promise of employment if it requires
conduct by the employee wholly apart from performance of ordinary job duties, such
as resigning from one position with the employer to accept the employer's offer of a
new post. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 349, 297 S.E.2d 647, 650
(1982). But see Sneed v. American Bank Stationery Co., 764 F. Supp. 65, 67 (W.D.
Va. 1991) (holding an offer of at-will employment revocable without cause even
though an employee had sold a home in California to accept a job in Virginia); Sartin
1994] 1009
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employment must be unequivocal, written, and signed by the
employer." An employee handbook can rebut the at-will pre-
sumption, the court reasoned, provided the manual satisfies the
statute of frauds by bearing the employer's signature."
Declining to decide whether this particular manual met the
signature requirement of the statute of frauds, the court held
Nichols had failed to rebut the presumption of at-will employ-
ment. 2 While the handbook may have been a unilateral con-
tract which Nichols was free to accept, the disclaimer was a
valid modification by Progress Printing. Nichols' decision to
continue working for Progress Printing, standing alone, supplied
the consideration necessary to support this modified contract."
Progress Printing was the first occasion the Virginia Supreme
Court recognized that promises of job security contained in a
personnel manual could rebut the at-will presumption and be
v. Mazur, 237 Va. 82, 85, 375 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1989) (holding that an offer of at-will
employment is terminable by an employer even if a promisee has resigned a former
job and moved to Virginia in order to accept a job offer). For a good analysis of em-
ployment contracts supported by separate consideration, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie? 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 397, 412-16 (1989).
10. The employer's promise of continued employment must be unambiguous. Thus,
in Addison v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 236 Va. 233, 372
S.E.2d 403 (1988), the employee alleged that his employer had agreed he could keep
his job "as long as he wanted one and as long as one existed." Addison, 236 Va. at
235, 372 S.E.2d at 404. The court found this promise too indefinite to rebut the at-
will presumption. Similarly, the plaintiff in Miller, 234 Va. at 462, 362 S.E.2d at 915,
claimed she had been promised employment with a non-profit agency as long as "ade-
quate federal funding" was available. According to the court, because the employer's
promise "bespoke'indefiniteness,' the plaintiff had failed to rebut the at-will presump-
tion. Miller, 234 Va. at 467, 362 S.E.2d at 918. See also Graham v. Central Fidelity
Bank, 245 Va. 395, 399 & n.5, 428 S.E.2d 916, 918 & n.5 (1993). Circuit courts in
the period under review have rejected breach of contract claims based on personnel
manuals which contained precatory or aspirational suggestions of job security. Spiller
v. James River Corp., 32 Va. Cir. 300, 306, (Richmond City 1993) (sustaining a de-
murrer to a claim that a personnel handbook constituted a contract because
"precatory language expressing [employer's] expectations and hopes for employment
relationships falls short of an expression of an offer of a unilateral contract of em-
ployment which could be terminated only for cause"); Burton v. Overnite Transp. Co.,
No. LU-2450-1, slip op. at 5, (Richmond City June 29, 1993) (sustaining an
employer's demurrer to a breach of contract claim and reasoning that "[tihings
aspirational are non-binding without any writing stating a contract term to permit
employment discharge only for cause.").
11. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 341, 421 S.E.2d at 430.
12. Id. at 342, 421 S.E.2d at 431.
13. Id. at 343, 421 S.E.2d at 431.
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enforced in contract. 4 On balance, however, Progress Printing
was a clear victory for employers. It made clear that an em-
ployer can immunize itself as a matter of law from liability for
job security provisions in a personnel manual through the sim-
ple expedient of a written disclaimer. 5 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Progress Printing court implicitly rejected the view es-
poused by a number of courts that any inconsistencies between
a termination for cause provision in an employee handbook and
a subsequent disclaimer by the employer may create an eviden-
tiary issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. 6
14. Id. at 341, 421 S.E.2d at 430. A majority of jurisdictions since the early
1980s have held that personnel handbooks or similar collections of written policies
which contain promises not to fire without cause are enforceable against the employer
under either a unilateral contract or promissory estoppel theory. In rejecting employer
arguments that personnel manuals are merely nonbinding guidelines, many of these
courts have emphasized the benefits management reaps when employees become con-
vinced that they cannot be fired without cause. Written promises of job security often
heighten worker morale, reduce turnover, and induce employees to ignore union or-
ganizers. See, e.g., Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 116
(Haw. 1986); Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989)
(reviewing various theories used by courts to find handbooks contractually binding);
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499
A.2d 515; Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 99 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (S.C. 1987); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087-88 (Wash. 1984). Trial courts applying Virginia
law have recognized that employee handbooks may bind employers. White v. Federal
Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1548 n.15 (E.D. Va. 1990); Seabolt v.
Westmoreland Coal Co., 703 F. Supp. 1235, 1238-40 (W.D. Va.), affd, 898 F.2d 144
(4th Cir. 1989) Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (E.D.
Va. 1987); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409, 418 (W.D. Va.
1985); Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 (W.D. Va. 1984); Frazier
v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 574 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Va. 1983); Byer v.
Vepco, 11 Va. Cir. 171, 178 (Richmond City 1988); Seitz v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 6 Va.
Cir. 428, 429-30 (Richmond City 1986); Laws v. Coleman-Bullington, Inc., 5 Va. Cir.
251, 265 (Richmond City 1985).
15. Progress Printing, 244 Va. at 343, 421 S.E.2d at 431.
16. The focus of this approach is upon the totality of the circumstances, including
the promises of job security contained in the employee handbook; the conspicuousness
and clarity of the disclaimer; the extent to which the employee assented to the
employer's purported modification of those promises; the nature of any consideration
the employee received for the contract modification; and whether the employer, in
modifying the manual, was motivated by a bad faith desire to retaliate against a par-
ticular employee. See, e.g., Burrill v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp. 804 F. Supp. 1356, 1360-
61 (D. Colo. 1992); Seehawer v. Magnecraft Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 910, 914-15 (N.D.
Ill. 1989); Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1235-36 (D.S.C. 1989); Thompson
v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va. 1987); Jones v. Cen-
tral Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1989); Allabashi v. Lincoln
Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Preston v. Claridge Hotel &
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While Nichols' failure to rebut the at-will presumption was
the focus of Progress Printing, another discharged employee's
inability to overcome the statute of frauds' one-year rule figured
prominently in Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank.' Betty Gra-
ham was a head teller for Central Fidelity Bank who insisted
her employer had told her she would not be terminated "except
for cause." The bank fired Graham while she was on a ninety-
day probation for a series of shortages in her cash drawer.
Graham sued the bank, claiming it had discharged her without
cause. To rebut the at-will presumption, Graham cited the
bank's oral promises of continued employment absent just cause
for dismissal, various provisions in the company's personnel
manual, and two disciplinary memoranda placing her on the
ninety-day probation.'"
In holding that the statute of frauds' one-year rule barred
Graham's oral contract claims, 9 the court reaffirmed Falls v.
Virginia State Bar.2" The Falls court set Virginia apart from
nearly all other jurisdictions by declaring that the statute of
frauds bars employees from enforcing oral "just cause" contracts
of indefinite duration." In virtually every jurisdiction, the stat-
Casino, Ltd., 555 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); McGinnis v.
Honeywell, Inc., 791 P.2d 452, 456-58 (N.M. 1990); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 472
N.E.2d 765, 774-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Johnson v. Nasca, 802 P.2d 1294, 1297
(Okla. Ct. App. 1990); Hannah v. United Refrigerated Serv., 430 S.E.2d 539, 541 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1993) (confirming the South Carolina rule that to be effective, a disclaimer
in a personnel handbook must meet the U.C.C. definition of "conspicuous"); Swanson
v. Liquid Air Corp., 826 P.2d 664, 674-77 (Wash. 1992); Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker
Mach. Co., 431 S.E.2d 687, 691 (W. Va. 1993). For recent analyses of the various ap-
proaches courts have taken to resolving conflicts between personnel handbooks and
employer disclaimers, see Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Ef-
fect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L. J., 326-85 (1991-92); David Dominguez, Just
Cause Protection: Will the Demise of Employment at Will Breathe New Life into Col-
lective Job Security? 28 IDAHO L. REV. 283, 300-305 (1992).
17. 245 Va. 395, 428 S.E.2d 916 (1993). The Virginia statute of frauds provides in
relevant part:
§ 11-2. WHEN WRITTEN EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ACTION.
Unless a promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or rati-
fication, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed
by the party to be charged or his agent, no action shall be brought in
any of the following cases:
8. Upon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year,
VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(8) (Repl. Vol 1993).
18. Graham, 245 Va. at 398-99, 428 S.E.2d at 918.
19. Id. at 398, 428 S.E.2d at 918.
20. 240 Va. 416, 397 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
21. Id. at 419, 397 S.E.2d at 673. But see Silverman v. Bernot, 218 Va. 650, 655,
1994] EMPLOYMENT LAW 1013
ute of frauds prohibits enforcement of oral contacts that cannot
be performed within one year. Traditionally, however, courts
have maintained that oral "just cause" contracts of indefinite
duration lie outside the statute of frauds because they can be
performed within one year. In this conventional view, the
employee's death, resignation or discharge within the first year
of the employment relationship completes the contract.' In
Falls, and again in Graham, the court adopted the novel posi-
tion that the employee's death or resignation during her first
year on the job would cause a contract of indefinite length to
terminate by operation of law, rather than by completion. In
the event of discharge or resignation, the parties' expectations
would be frustrated rather than fulfilled.' Applying these
principles, the court in Graham held that the oral assurances
alleged by the fired bank teller "cannot be considered in decid-
ing whether she had an employment contract that could be ter-
minated only for cause." '
The court also dismissed Graham's strained argument that
various written statements rebutted the at-will presumption by
making the parties' contract into one of fixed duration.' The
239 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1977) (holding that a promise of employment until a worker
turns 62 or the employer dies, whichever should occur first, was not barred by the
statute of frauds since the employer might die during first year, thereby completing
the contract).
22. See, e.g., Badgett v. Northwestern Resources Co., 818 F. Supp. 998, 1001
(W.D. Tex. 1993); Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 828 (N.D. Ill.
1993); Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 823 F.2d 559, 562 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ford v.
Tandy Transp., Inc., 620 N.E.2d 996, 1008 (Ohio App. 1993); C. R. Klewin, Inc. v.
Flagship Properties, Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 779 (Conn. 1991); Hejmadi v. AMFAC, Inc.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 5, 16 (1988); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280, 283 (N.M.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1989); 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 446, at 549-50
(1950) ("A contract for 'permanent' employment is not within the one-year clause for
the reason that such a contract will be fully performed, according to its terms, upon
the death of the employee."); 3 WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS § 495, at 582 (3d ed. 1960)
("A promise of permanent personal performance is on fair interpretation a promise of
performance for life, and therefore is not within the Statute."); Frank Vickory, The
Erosion of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine and the Statute of Frauds: Time to
Amend the Statute, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 97, 99 (1992) (discussing the traditional rule
that "a contract for 'permanent' or 'lifetime' employment is not governed by the stat-
ute [of frauds] since such a contract would be fully performed if, for instance, the
employee were to die within the year").
23. Graham, 245 Va. at 399, 428 S.E.2d at 918; Falls, 240 Va. at 419, 397 S.E.2d
at 672-73.
24. Graham, 245 Va. at 399, 428 S.E.2d at 918.
25. Id. at 400, 428 S.E.2d at 918.
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court found dispositive the bank's clearly written disclaimer
that employees could be terminated at any time "with or with-
out cause."' Despite this handbook disclaimer, Graham argued
that the bank's policy of holding annual employee reviews indi-
cated she could have performed her contract within one year, a
line of reasoning the court refused to adopt." Similarly, Gra-
ham failed to convince the court that the bank's two disciplin-
ary memoranda imposing a ninety-day probation rebutted the
at-will presumption by transforming the parties' agreement into
one of fixed duration. "[I]n the absence of proof of a clear intent
to do so, disciplinary letters should not be construed to convert
at-will employment contracts into contracts for fixed periods."'m
In sum, the Virginia Supreme Court's decisions in Progress
Printing and Graham limit an employee's prospects of succeed-
ing on a claim that her employer should be held accountable in
contract for violating oral or written termination rules.
The ponderous opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Swengler v. ITT Corp., Electro-Optical
Products Division'9 is a more dramatic step in the same direc-
tion. There, ITT extended a written offer of employment to
Swengler which was silent as to whether the company needed
cause to fire him. Swengler accepted by letter."0 During his
orientation, Swengler asked for copies of ITT employment poli-
cies that applied to him. The corporation's personnel depart-
ment responded by handing Swengler a policy memorandum
usually reserved for supervisory personnel, rather than employ-
ees in Swengler's position." The memorandum declared that
ITT could discharge employees only if their personnel records
26. Id. at 399, 428 S.E.2d at 918.
27. Id. at 400, 428 S.E.2d at 918. See Smithson v. Juby, No. CL 92-179, slip op.
at 4 (Fredricksburg City Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) ("The American, or majority, view is
that a contractual expression of compensation in terms of a time unit does not, with-
out more, give rise to a hiring for that or any other particular, definite period.");
Ashley v. Wintergreen, No. CL 1967, slip op. at 2 (Amherst County Cir. Ct. Dec. 6,
1993) ("The phrase 'annual starting salary' is insufficient to establish a contract of
employment for at least one year.').
28. Graham, 245 Va. at 400, 428 S.E.2d at 918-19.
29. 993 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 1066.
31. Id.
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contained "objective, reasonable evidence to support the decision
to terminate."3
2
When Swengler was fired, he sued ITT on several liability
theories including breach of contract.' Swengler alleged that,
in addition to giving him the termination memorandum during
his initial interview, company officials indicated that employees
could be fired only "for cause" and that the position would be
"permanent and full time."' The United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia granted ITT's motion for a
directed verdict, finding that the corporation had sufficient
cause under the policy memorandum to fire Swengler.'
The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds, holding
that neither the alleged oral promise nor the policy memoran-
dum removed Swengler's employment from the at-will catego-
ry." The parole evidence rule barred Swengler from supple-
menting the written employment offer with testimony concern-
ing the oral promise of continued employment absent just cause
for dismissal. Pointing to Virginia law, the court of appeals
explained that parties may supplement written contract terms
with evidence of oral agreements "only iff. (1) the parties did not
reduce their entire agreement to writing; (2) the extrinsic evi-
dence does not contradict or vary the written terms; and (3) the
extrinsic evidence involves items on which the parties agreed
contemporaneously with the writing."37 The court of appeals
found that ITT's written offer contained the parties' entire
agreement. In addition, the alleged oral promise, which came
during Swengler's initial interview, was not contemporaneous
with the letter confirming the terms of his employment which
was sent thirty to forty days later.'
Even more ground-breaking was the court's conclusion that
the company's written termination provisions were inapplicable
to Swengler. In the court's view, the policy memorandum pro-
tected only those employees who received it without asking:
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1068.
34. Id. at 1066.
35. Id. at 1068.
36. Id. at 1069-70.
37. Id. at 1069.
38. Id.
1994] 1015
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The general rule recognizes that no implied contract arises
from policy manuals which are not generally distributed to
employees. We think that, under Virginia law, this rule
should also apply when an employer does not generally
distribute a policy manual, but instead provides such a
manual only upon request by an employee.
Because ITT does not generally distribute its internal policy
memo to employees and provided the memo to Swengler
only after he requested a copy, the internal policy memo
cannot be used to create an implied condition to Swengler's
employment contract.39
The court's curious rationale could lead to anomalous results.
Apparently, Swengler allows employers to avoid liability for
written job security policies simply by giving the documents
only to those employees who are sufficiently concerned about
job security to request a copy of the rules governing dismiss-
al.4°
B. Express Contracts Of Employment
In addition to decisions concerning at-will employees, the
Supreme Court of Virginia published two opinions in 1993 con-
struing express contracts of employment.4' Pinkerton Tobacco
39. Id. at 1070.
40. The court remarked in a footnote that no binding contract could exist since
Swengler understood he was free to quit at any time. "Under the doctrine of mutuali-
ty, if Swengler could quit at any time, ITT could also fire Swengler at any time." Id.
at 1070 n.4. This alternative basis for finding Swengler an at-will employee is diffi-
cult to square with Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 976, 59 S.E.2d
110, 115 (1950) (holding that "the doctrine of mutuality is inapplicable" when the em-
ployer has made a written commitment not to fire an employee without just cause,
even in the absence of a corresponding promise on the part of the employee to re-
main with the company for any definite time).
41. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also construed an
express contract of employment in Dyncorp v. Carnicero, 996 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1993).
Under the parties' agreement, the employer, a corporation, agreed to retain the em-
ployee as a consultant following termination of the employment relationship. Id. at
56. The consultancy was to last a minimum of five years, "and thereafter on a year-
to-year basis," which the corporation could terminate "at any time" upon "one year's
prior written notice" or by paying him "one year's salary." Id. At the end of the
fourth year, the employer notified the employee that it would not retain him after
the conclusion of the fifth year. Id. at 57. The district court agreed with the employ-
ee that the employer was required by the contract to wait until the year-to-year
1016
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Co. v. Melton," dealt with whether a discharged corporate vice
president was contractually entitled to an accrued award under
a performance incentive plan. Pinkerton Tobacco's plan guaran-
teed key management personnel enhanced compensation if the
corporation reached financial performance goals during a three-
year cycle.' According to the plan: "[i]f a participant leaves
the Company before the end of a performance cycle for reasons
other than death, disability or retirement, the units awarded to
the incumbent would be forfeited and reclaimed for distribution
to other participants."" Pinkerton Tobacco fired Melton in the
midst of a three-year cycle. Although at first company officials
said Melton would receive at least a pro-rated share of an
award under the plan, the company subsequently denied his
claim on the ground that Melton's dismissal was a disqualifying
event.45 Melton then filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit
Court of Chesterfield County, contending that the words,
"leaves the Company," suggest strongly that only participants
who voluntarily depart Pinkerton Tobacco forfeit their interest
under the plan." The trial court, concluding that the plan was
ambiguous, allowed a jury to decide whether Melton was enti-
tled to an award.47 The employer appealed a jury verdict in
Melton's favor."
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court erred
in permitting a jury to construe the plan.49 The court decided
that discharged employees plainly had no right to an award.
The court acknowledged that the words "leaves the Company"
would render the plan ambiguous if these terms stood alone.5 °
extensions began before terminating the relationship. Id. Thus, in the district court's
view, the employee must have received at least a single, one-year extension before
the employer could exercise its termination option. The court of appeals reversed and
entered judgment for the employer. Id. at 58-59. Pointing to the section of the con-
tract which rendered the year-to-year extensions "terminable at any time," the court
held that the corporation need not wait five years before giving written notice of
termination. Id. at 57.
42. 246 Va. 356, 437 S.E.2d 923 (1993).
43. Id. at 357, 437 S.E.2d at 924.
44. Id. at 358, 437 S.E.2d at 924.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 361, 437 S.E.2d at 926.
50. Id. at 359, 437 S.E.2d at 924-25.
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In the majority's view, however, by enumerating "death, disabil-
ity and retirement" as exceptions, the parties had agreed that
an employee who departs under any other circumstances would
lose plan benefits. 1 Finding the majority's construction unten-
able and the plan inherently ambiguous, Justice Lacy dissented
declaring that the jury's award to Melton should be affirmed. 2
Meanwhile, the employee in Fun v. Virginia Military Insti-
tute' fared better. Winnie Fun was a librarian employed on
an annual basis by Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"). Under
its personnel regulations, VMI could terminate Fun either by
electing not to renew her contract at the end of the year or by
dismissing her at any time. To exercise its nonrenewal option,
the regulations required VMI to notify Fun of its decision at
least six months prior to the end of her annual contract
term.' While an elaborate grievance procedure was available
to dismissed employees, Fun had no grievance rights in the
event VMI terminated her through nonrenewal.'
In November 1989, Fun's supervisor notified her by letter
that she would be removed from the university payroll no later
51. Id. at 360, 437 S.E.2d at 925.
52. Id. at 364, 437 S.E.2d at 927.
53. 245 Va. 249, 427 S.E.2d 181 (1993). Although public sector employment law is
beyond the scope of this article, Fun is included here because the decision is a good
example of an employee seeking to enforce her rights under an express contract.
Readers should note that Virginia courts recently delivered several other interesting
opinions concerning the statutory grievance rights of public employees. See County
Sch. Bd. of York County v. Epperson, 246 Va. 214, 435 S.E.2d 647 (1993) (holding
that complaints filed by two public school teachers concerning their involuntary
transfers from one school to another within the same division failed to qualify as
"grievances" within the meaning of the statute); Underwood v. Henry County Sch.
Bd., 245 Va. 127, 427 S.E.2d 330 (1993) (rejecting the challenge of a teacher who had
achieved continuing contract status to school board's decision to terminate her as part
of a reduction in force while retaining a probationary instructor in her place); Burk v.
Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 31 Va. Cir. 426 (Loudoun County 1993) (holding that a
letter written to a teacher by her supervisor implying criticism of the teacher's per-
formance and placed in her personnel file was grievable); Lee v. Fairfax County, 29
Va. Cir. 300 (Fairfax County 1992) (finding a county employee's complaint that the
county misapplied policies in failing to promote her to head teacher was non-grievable
before the Fairfax County Civil Service Commission); Lasus v. George Mason Univ.,
29 Va. Cir. 51 (Fairfax County 1992) (upholding the decision by a university official
to deny a professor a grievance panel hearing concerning a negative performance
evaluation the professor received).
54. Fun, 245 Va. at 251, 427 S.E.2d at 182.
55. Id.
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than the following October. The letter stated, "[a]s I explained
to you, the regulations for dismissal of an administrative staff
member of your seniority require only four month's notice, and
a year's notice is generous."' Several months later, after the
university had rebuffed Fun's request for a hearing, the dean of
faculty wrote her that the November letter from the supervisor
"was intended to be notification of non-renewal [sic]."57 Fun
filed an action in the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County, join-
ing state law breach of contract counts with a procedural due
process claim under both the Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.8
The issue on appeal to the supreme court was whether the
circuit court had erred in sustaining VMIs demurrer to Fun's
motion for judgment. 9 The supreme court held that Fun had
successfully pled a cause of action for breach of her contractual
right to proper notice of termination." Fun alleged in her
pleading that the employer's November letter was a notice of
dismissal rather than nonrenewal and thus entitled her to use
the university grievance procedure afforded discharged employ-
ees. The court observed that the November letter referred only
to "regulations for dismissal." 1 The letter's silence on the sub-
ject of contract nonrenewal lent credence to Fun's claim. Rea-
soning that on demurrer "doubts must be resolved in favor of
the construction given the letter by Fun in her pleadings," the
supreme court reversed the trial court and remanded Fun's
breach of contract claims for trial. 2
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 252, 427 S.E.2d at 182-83.
60. Id. at 253, 427 S.E.2d at 183.
61. Id. at 183.
62. Id. While the employee in Fun overcame the defendant's demurrer to her
state law breach of contract claims, the court dismissed her procedural due process
count. Id. The court noted that Fun did not claim VMrs grievance procedure was
facially unconstitutional. Instead, Fun's claim was that her superiors at VMI had
committed wrongs that the court characterized as "random and unauthorized acts of
state officials or employees in contravention of established procedures . . . " Id. Com-
paring Fun to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), the court held that ran-
dom violations of facially constitutional procedures do "not offend due process re-
quirements when adequate post-deprivation remedies exist." Fun, 245 Va. at 253, 427
S.E.2d at 183. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136-38 (1990) (stating
preconditions for application of Parratt). In the court's view, VMrs failure to provide
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C. Tort Claims Against Employers
While employers have won most breach of contract battles
brought by discharged employees that have reached appellate
courts in the last two years, just the opposite is true in the tort
arena. The Supreme Court of Virginia within the last year
delivered four opinions addressing tort actions brought by em-
ployees charging their employers with misconduct. Employees
prevailed in three of these actions.
The question presented in Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educa-
tion Systems' was "whether former employees who allege they
were terminated from their respective at-will employments be-
cause of their race and sex have causes of action against their
former employers for wrongful discharge."" Lawanda Lockhart,
an African-American, sued Commonwealth College in Norfolk
Circuit Court for discharging her because of her race.'
In an unrelated case, Nancy Wright filed a tort action in the
Circuit Court of Loudoun County against a sole proprietorship,
Donelly & Company, charging that its owner had terminated
her for refusing to accede to his sexual advances.' The trial
court in each action sustained the employer's demurrer.
The issue raised by both suits on appeal was whether the
public policy exception to the at-will rule recognized in Bowman
v. State Bank of Keysville67 was broad enough to cover dis-
charges rooted in racial and gender discrimination. In Bowman,
the plaintiffs were at-will employees working at the same bank
Fun with a post-deprivation hearing in accordance with the due process clause did
not rise to the level of a constitutional tort because the plaintiff could obtain com-
plete relief through filing a breach of contract action in state court. Fun, 245 Va. at
253, 427 S.E.2d at 183. Although limited precedent supports this application of
Parratt in the context of employment termination, see Hartwick v. Board of Trustees
of Johnson City Com. Col., 782 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D. Kan. 1992), one federal court
in Virginia has rejected essentially the same argument accepted by the supreme court
in Fun. Bockes v. Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (W.D. Va. 1992), modified on other
grounds, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).
63. 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).
64. Id. at 100, 439 S.E.2d at 328.
65. Id. at 101, 439 S.E.2d at 329.
66. Id. at 102, 439 S.E.2d at 330.
67. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
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in which they owned stock. The plaintiffs alleged they were dis-
charged for refusing to vote their shares in favor of a proposal
by the bank's directors to merge with another corporation.'
Overruling the directors' demurrer, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that the at-will employees had a cause of action in tort for
retaliatory discharge because the Virginia Stock Corporation Act
guarantees stockholders the right to vote their shares freely. 9
As narrowed by Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.,' ° an employee may
bring a cause of action under Bowman to redress only "dis-
charges... underlying existing laws designed to protect the
property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety or welfare of
the people in general."71
68. Id. at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 800.
69. Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
70. 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
71. Id. at 465, 362 S.E.2d at 918. Courts applying Virginia law have read Miller
to require that the "public policy" at stake must-be clearly enunciated by statute.
Most courts have recognized a cause of action in tort under Bowman only when the
discharge is in retaliation either for the employee's refusal to commit an illegal act or
for his or her exercise of a statutory right. See, e.g., Weaver v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 805 F. Supp. 10, 11 (W.D. Va. 1992) ("When no statute is implicated, the dis-
charge of an at-will employee is lawful, and the employee's wrongful discharge suit
must be dismissed."); Haigh v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332,
1351 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that the public policy exception to the at-will rule is
"triggered only when the discharge is in response to the employee's refusal to commit
an unlawful act or in the employee's exercise of a statutory right"). Compare Roland
v. BEon Air Cleaners, Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 184, 186 (Richmond City 1990) (holding that an
employee fired for filing a claim for partial unemployment compensation benefits has
a Bowman claim) and Millsap v. Synon, Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 261, 262 (Fairfax County
1990) (holding that an at-will employee discharged in retaliation for filing a wage
claim with Virginia Employment Commission has a Bowman claim) with Pierce v.
Foreign Mission Bd., 28 Va. Cir. 168, 177 (Richmond City 1992) (holding that an
employee fired for lodging a grievance in accordance with an employer's internal poli-
cies and procedures has no Bowman claim). An employee who is fired for reporting
illegal activity by the employer also may state a claim for breach of public policy.
Compare Seay v. Grace Jefferson Home, 26 Va. Cir. 355, 361 (Richmond City 1992)
(holding that an employee fired for whistle-blowing to a state inspector regarding the
illegal practices of his employer, has a Bowman claim.) with Newman v. Medical
Facilities of Am., 28 Va. Cir. 501, 504 (Nelson County 1992) (holding that an employ-
ee fired for reporting illegal incidents in a health care facility to an employer fails to
state a Bowman claim). Most jurisdictions share the view expressed by the Virginia
Supreme Court in Miller; only firings which directly implicate statutes or at least
matters of widespread public importance give rise to a cause of action for breach of
public policy, Miller, 234 Va. at 467-69, 362 S.E.2d at 918-19. Deprivations of an at-
will employee's private rights do not support a cause of action. See, e.g., Clark v.
Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 328 (3d Cir. 1993) (predicting that "Pennsylvania
will not recognize a wrongful discharge claim when an at-will employee's discharge is
based on a disagreement with management about the legality of a proposed course of
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In Lockhart, the court held that the plaintiffs had successful-
ly pled Bowman claims. 2 In a 4-3 majority opinion written by
Justice Hassell, the court noted that "the personal freedom to
pursue employment free of discrimination based on race or
gender" was even more important than a stockholder's right "to
exercise the right to vote stock free of duress and intimidation
from corporate management."" The court pointed to the Gen-
eral Assembly's declaration that employment discrimination
based upon race or gender violates parole policy in the Virginia
Human Rights Acts. 4 The court brushed aside the employers'
formidable defense that the Virginia Human Rights Act ex-
pressly provides that it does not create private causes of ac-
action unless the action the employer wants to take actually violates the law.");
Prince v. Rescorp Realty, 940 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that an em-
ployee who was fired for reporting violations of the State Fire Marshall Act to state
officials has a claim for wrongful discharge under illinois law); Niesent v. Homestake
Mining Co., 505 N.W.2d. 781, 783 (S.D. 1993) (confirming the existence of a tort
cause of action for breaches of public policy and stating that "[plublic policy is found
in the letter or purpose of a constitutional or statutory provision or scheme, or in a
judicial decision."); Percell v. Int'l Business Machs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 297, 300
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (dismissing a breach of public policy claim and reasoning that "[tihe
question of how defendant handled appeals of management decisions is not a matter
which implicates general public policy concerns and is instead largely a matter of in-
terest only to the private parties involved."); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp. 551 S.W.2d
811, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (dismissing a claim by an employee fired for electing to
attend night school); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Services, 632 A.2d 463, 471 (Md.
App. 1993) (holding that an employee fired for exercising a statutory duty to report'
child abuse and neglect states a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy); Lee v. Denro, Inc., 605 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Md. App. 1992) (holding that when
an at-will employee "fails to demonstrate that his or her grievance is anything more
than private dispute regarding employer's execution of normal management operating
procedures, there is no cause of action for abusive discharge"); Sides v. Duke Univ.,
328 S.E.2d 818, 826-27 (N.C. App. 1985) (recognizing a cause of action by an employ-
ee fired for refusing the employer's demands that she commit perjury); Ressler v.
Humane Soc'y, 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) (stating that the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will rule applies to retaliatory discharge for honoring subpoena and
testifying truthfully); Smith v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 825 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla. 1992)
(holding that the public policy exception to the at-will rule was applicable to an em-
ployee fired in retaliation for denying a zoning variance while acting in his capacity
as mayor and voting member of a town's board of trustees); Campbell v. Ford Indus.,
546 P.2d 141, 146 (Or. 1976) (dismissing a breach of public policy claim by a corpo-
rate employee fired for exercising his rights as a shareholder to inspect the
corporation's records); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Or. 1975) (recognizing a
cause of action by an employee fired for serving as a juror).
72. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
73. Id. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
74. Id. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Repl. Vol.
1987).
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tion" The majority responded that the Virginia Human Rights
Act, which was enacted in 1987, merely codified the
commonwealth's pre-existing public policy against racial and
sexual discrimination in the workplace. 6
We recognize that the Virginia Human Rights Act does not
create any new causes of action. Code § 2.1-725. Here, we
do not rely upon the Virginia Human Rights Act to create
new causes of action. Rather, we rely solely on the narrow
exception that we recognized in 1985 in Bowman, decided
two years before the enactment of the Virginia Human
Rights Act.'
As a result of Lockhart, employees discharged on the basis of
race or gender have a choice between filing a wrongful dis-
charge action in state court or proceeding in federal court under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 Opting for state
court holds several advantages for plaintiffs. For instance, the
Title VII scheme requires employees to submit discrimination
complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
before filing suit in federal court.79 Title VII, moreover, applies
only to employers with fifteen or more employees and caps the
amount of damages employees may recover.' Thus, a Lockhart
claim in state court, free of these federal limitations, may prove
attractive to employees with discrimination complaints.
One of the most significant aspects of Lockhart is that the
availability of adequate statutory remedies is irrelevant to
whether the employee has a Bowman claim.8 A few courts in
75. Id. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (Repl. Vol. 1987) pro-
vides:
Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an
independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions. Nor shall
the policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to allow tort ac-
tions to be instituted instead of or in addition to the current statutory
actions for unlawful discrimination.
76. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
77. Id.
78. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
79. Id. § 2000e-5.
80. Id. § 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (bX3) (1988).
81. Lockhart, 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 332. The court relied upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-7 (1988), which provides: "Nothing in this subchapter . . . shall be deemed to
exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provid-
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Virginia have held that a plaintiff may bring a Bowman claim
only when he or she lacks another remedy to redress his or her
wrongful discharge. 2 Thus in Cauthorne v. King," the plain-
tiffs alleged they were discharged for protesting the racially-
motivated discrimination practices of their employer, a real
estate broker, aimed toward African-American home buyers.
The plaintiffs brought a Bowman claim as well as an action
under the Virginia Fair Housing Law" for retaliatory dis-
charge." The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond sustained
the employer's demurrer to the plaintiffs' Bowman claim but
allowed them to proceed with their Fair Housing Law count."
ed by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a
State .... "
82. See, e.g., Shields v. PC-Expanders, Inc., 31 Va. Cir. 90, 93 (Fairfax County
1993); Cauthorne v. King, 30 Va. Cir. 202, 205 (Richmond City 1993); Pruitt v.
Johnston Memorial Hosp., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 188, 189 (Washington County 1990). A
Virginia circuit court has held that only at-will employees may bring Bowman claims.
Gulledge v. Dyncorp, Inc., 24 Va. Cir. 538, 542 (Fairfax County 1989); see also
Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 581 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Mass. 1991) (holding
that only at-will employees can sue to recover for discharges in violation of public
policy). Before Lockhart, one federal court held that an employee whose discharge
violated the Virginia Human Rights Act could sue for breach of public policy, Fielder
v. Southco, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 577, 578 (W.D. Va. 1988), while others questioned
whether the Supreme Court of Virginia would recognize a Bowman claim of this
nature. Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 744, 748 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1991); White
v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1550 (E.D. Va. 1990). In 1991, the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County concluded that victims of workplace discrimination
did not have a Bowman claim. Schryer v. VBR, 25 Va. Cir. 464, 469-70 (Fairfax
County 1991).
Courts applying the law of other states have reached varying decisions when
confronted with claims by employees that their discriminatory discharges give rise to
a cause of action in tort for breach of public policy. See, e.g., Hughes v. Matthews,
986 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that Arkansas would refuse to recognize
a wrongful discharge action based on pregnancy discrimination); Harrison v. Edison
Bros. Apparel Stores, 924 F.2d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff who
alleges that she was fired for refusing her employer's sexual advances has a tort
claim despite the availability of federal remedies under Title VII); Smith v. Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., 777 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that there is no
breach of public policy claim for discriminatory discharge based on race or gender);
Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 766 (Md. 1991) (holding that there is no
common law cause of action for an abusive discharge for sexual discrimination be-
cause federal "statutes provide the remedies for their violation"); Foster v. Albertsons,
Inc., 835 P.2d 720, 726 (Mont. 1992) ("Montana has recognized a common law cause
of action for retaliatory discharge related to sexual harassment.").
83. 30 Va. Cir. 202 (Richmond City 1993).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 to -96.23 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
85. Cauthorne, 30 Va. Cir. at 203.
86. Id. at 205.
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The court reasoned that "[t]he public policy exception recognized
in Bowman contemplated the absence of another reme-
dy .... " 87
In Shields v. PC-Expanders, Inc.,' the plaintiff alleged that
he was fired in retaliation for complaining to the Federal De-
partment of Labor that his employer refused to pay him for
working overtime hours. The plaintiff asserted that the
company's action violated both public policy under Bowman and
federal labor statutes. 9 The Circuit Court of Fairfax County
framed the question posed by PC-Expanders' demurrer as
"whether the existence of that federal remedy should dissuade
this Court from recognizing the alleged violation as a public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine of employment in Virgin-
ia."' Answering its own question in the affirmative, the circuit
court held that Bowman claims should be limited to those
unique circumstances when exceptions to the at-will rule are
both appropriate and necessary.9' Since the plaintiff had an
"extensive and ample" remedy under federal statutes, the court
declined to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will rule
and dismissed his Bowman claim. 2 After Lockhart, the circuit
court's reading of Bowman is in question.
In contrast to Lockhart, where the Plaintiff filed a Bowman
claim for breach of public policy, Norfolk Airport Authority v.
Nordwall" involved a plaintiff seeking to recover from a retal-
iatory discharge by invoking available statutory remedies. In
Nordwall, the court held that the Virginia Right to Work
Law' prohibits municipal subdivisions from retaliating against
their supervisory personnel for joining labor unions.95 Carl
87. Id. at 204.
88. 31 Va. Cir. 90 (Fairfax County 1993).
89. Id.; see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(aX3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(aX3)
(1992) (prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees who file actions un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act).
90. Shields, 31 Va. Cir. at 93.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. 246 Va. 391, 436 S.E.2d 436 (1993).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58 to -69 (Repl. Vol. 1990). Two sections of the Right
to Work Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-63, -67 (Repl. Vol. 1990), grant circuit courts
jurisdiction to award compensatory damages and injunctive relief to redress violations
of the Act's substantive provisions.
95. Nordwall, 246 Va. at 395, 436 S.E.2d at 437.
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Nordwall served as a captain of the Norfolk Airport Authority's
fire department. The Authority discharged Nordwall solely be-
cause he joined the International Association of Fire Fighters,
the same union to which several of his subordinates be-
longed.' Nordwall sued the Authority, alleging that it had vio-
lated Virginia Code section 40.1-61, which provides that "[n]o
person shall be required by an employer to abstain or refrain
from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment."' The
Authority argued that this broad language excludes supervisory
employees. 8 In the defendant's view, extending Virginia's
Right to Work Law to supervisory employees would "innovate
upon, unsettle and disregard an entire body of labor law" be-
cause neither the National Labor Relations Act'2 nor the Fed-
eral Labor Management Relations Act °" protects supervi-
sors.'' Unpersuaded by the Authority's reliance on federal
law, the court indicated that these federal labor laws do not
apply to employees of states or their political subdivisions"2
and affirmed the order of the Circuit Court of Norfolk reinstat-
ing Nordwall with back pay."2
Employees also scored an important triumph in Middlekauff
v. Allstate Insurance Co.' Texanna Middlekauff sued her for-
mer employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Circuit Court of Roanoke County sustained the employer's
plea in bar and held that Middlekauffs exclusive remedy lay
under the Virginia Workers Compensation Act.'0' Middlekauff
tested the vitality of Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co." In Haddon, the Supreme Court held that the Workers
Compensation Act contained the exclusive remedy for a claim of
96. Id. at 393, 436 S.E.2d at 437.
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-61 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
98. Nordwall, 246 Va. at 394, 436 S.E.2d at 438.
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1992).
100. Id. §§ 141-188.
101. Nordwall, 246 Va. at 394, 436 S.E.2d at 438.
102. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
103. Nordwall, 246 Va. at 394, 436 S.E.2d at 439.
104. 247 Va. 150, 439 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
105. Id. at 152, 439 S.E.2d at 395-96.
106. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress based on persistent
sexual harassment." '
The Middlekauff court overruled Haddon "to the extent it
placed gradually incurred injuries within the definition of 'inju-
ry by accident."'~ The court emphasized that the Workers'
Compensation Act"° provides the exclusive form of relief for
an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment."'1 ° Middlekauffs employer had intentionally deni-
grated her over an extended period because of her heavy
weight."' Middlekauffs emotional injuries represented the cu-
mulative result of long term abuse." The statutory terms,
"injury by accident," however, mean a sudden, precipitating
event causing immediate harm."' Since Middlekauffs injury
fell outside this definition, she was free to pursue common law
remedies rather than file a claim for workers' compensation."
While certainly less far reaching than either Lockhart or
Middlekauff, the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in
Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin"5 is a good illustration
of the difficulty employees encounter meeting the heightened
standard of proof for fraud in suits against their employers,
particularly when no written employment agreement exists.
Alequin sued the defendant, Evaluation Research Corporation
(ERC), for actual and constructive fraud after a government
contractor dismissed him from his post as a technician.
Alequin's termination came on the heels of the ERC's loss of a
subcontract for work at Elgin Air Force Base."6 Alequin al-
leged that the defendant had fraudulently induced him to re-
sign from his previous employment and join a team of ERC
107. Id. at 399, 389 S.E.2d at 713-14.
108. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 397. Middlekauff left unclear
whether intentional torts that do not cause "gradually incurred injuries" lie outside
the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act. See id. at 155, 439 S.E.2d at 397.
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1307 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
110. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 153, 439 S.E.2d at 396.
111. Id. at 151, 439 S.E.2d at 395.
112. Id. at 153, 439 S.E.2d at 396.
113. Id. at 154, 439 S.E.2d at 397. See also Merillat Indus. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429,
433, 436 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1993); Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 584, 385 S.E.2d 858,
862 (1989).
114. Middlekauff, 247 Va. at 154-55, 439 S.E.2d at 397.
115. 247 Va. 143, 439 S.E.2d 387 (1994).
116. Id. at 145, 439 S.E.2d at 388.
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employees assigned to the Elgin Air Force Base project. At
trial, Alequin testified that ERC and its manager had assured
him the firm "did not hire on a contract basis.""1 The plaintiff
insisted that this statement necessarily was equivalent to a
representation that ERC hired on an "overhead" basis, meaning
that Alequin would be retained even if the employer lacked a
specific contract on which he could work at a given time."'
Witnesses for ERC testified that the company never hired em-
ployees on a short-term, single-contract basis, although they
acknowledged that the company had a policy against keeping
"people on overhead for an extended period of time.""9 ERC
officials also testified that the company told Alequin "there are
no guarantees in this business," but that they would try to find
another job for him within the company once the Elgin Air
Force Base project ended.2 A jury in the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County returned a $100,000 verdict for Alequin.' 1
In upending the jur's verdict, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that Alequin's burden had been to prove each element of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence." The record consisted
of conflicting testimony. Even assuming ERC promised Alequin
that it was not hiring him on a "contract basis," he did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that this statement
amounted to a false representation that he was being employed
on a long term "overhead" basis."
II. ACTIONS AGAINST EMPLOYEES
Since 1992, the Supreme Court of Virginia has delivered a
series of decisions in both tort and contract concerning employ-
117. Id. at 145, 439 S.E.2d at 389.
118. Id.
119. Id at 147, 439 S.E.2d at 390.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 148, 439 S.E.2d at 390. The plaintiff must prove six elements to pre-
vail on an actual fraud claim: (1) a false representation, (2) of a material fact, (3)
made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5) with reliance by the
party misled, and (6) resulting damage to the party misled. Id. The court explained
that constructive fraud, in contrast, involves an innocent or negligent misrepresenta-
tion of material fact, rather than intentional misrepresentation. Id. Otherwise, this
same test applies to both species of fraud. Id.
123. Id. at 149, 439 S.E.2d at 391.
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ees and former employees. Viewed as a whole, these opinions
increase, for employers, the utility of plainly written covenants
against competition in their contracts with employees.
A. Restraints on Competition from Former Employees
The Supreme Court of Virginia continues to uphold only
those non-competition covenants that are narrowly drafted and
unambiguous in scope. In Garcia v. Clinch Valley Physi-
cians,' Garcia, a physician, entered into the following non-
competition agreement as part of his employment contract with
Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. (CVP): "Practice after Termina-
tion: Upon termination of this agreement, for any reasons what-
soever, the Physician shall not, for a period of three (3) years
thereafter, engage in the practice of medicine or surgery in a
radius of twenty-five (25) miles of Richlands."M
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Circuit Court of
Tazewell County's decision that this restriction was inapplicable
to Garcia.' The Garcia Court emphasized that it must con-
strue the non-competition covenant strictly against the employ-
er as a disfavored restraint upon economic liberty.2 Guided
by this rule of strict construction, the court held that Garcia
had not breached the covenant and also stressed that the
parties' contract restrained Garcia from competing freely upon
termination of the agreement "for any reasons whatsoev-
er . . .. "M Construing this language narrowly, the court held
that the covenant applied only to those instances in which CVP
had terminated an employee for cause." The covenant was
inapplicable because CVP had not terminated Garcia for cause.
Instead, the employer had declined to renew Garcia's contract
upon expiration. 3
Garcia stands for the proposition that employers must define
critical terms explicitly in their non-competition agreements.
124. 243 Va. 286, 414 S.E.2d 599 (1992).
125. Id. at 288, 414 S.E.2d at 600.
126. Id. at 290, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
127. Id. at 289, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
128. Id. at 290, 414 S.E.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Courts will not undertake a searching analysis of the parties'
intent. After Garcia, even the most technical distinctions be-
tween the circumstances surrounding termination of employ-
ment and those described in the parties' contract may render
the non-competition covenant inoperative.''
The Supreme Court of Virginia's reluctance to hamstring the
marketplace ventures of former employees without an unambig-
uous non-competition covenant was also evident in Peace v.
Conway.'32 The employer, Apollo Hair Systems, supplied hair
replacement units to customers in accordance with a written
contract." Wendy Dickens and Sally Peace sold hair re-
placements as at-will employees who worked without a written
agreement governing their employment or post-employment
conduct.M
Peace and Dickens left Apollo without taking any supplies,
customer lists or other documents and opened a competing hair
salon on March 18, 1992. They aggressively solicited more than
100 of Apollo's clients, successfully luring away many."M Apol-
lo then secured a permanent injunction in the Circuit Court of
Chesterfield County that prohibited Peace and Dickens from
contacting or dealing with any person who had been an Apollo
customer as of March 1, 1992.36
The Virginia Supreme Court dissolved the circuit court's
injunction.'37 Peace and Dickens had relied solely upon their
memories in compiling a list of Apollo's customers. Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Agency," the court held that in the
absence of a covenant not to compete, an employee may solicit
her former employer's customers.'39 Provided the employee
131. Id. The court stated that even if its construction of the non-competition cove-
nant "may not have been what CVP intended when it drafted this provision, we are
limited to the language of the contract, strictly construed." Id.
132. 246 Va. 278, 435 S.E.2d 133 (1993).
133. Id. at 279, 435 S.E.2d at 134.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 282, 435 S.E.2d at 134-35.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
139. Peace, 246 Va. at 281-82, 435 S.E.2d at 135. The court observed that Apollo
could have protected its client base by having employees execute agreements not to
solicit the company's customers. Id. In other decisions, the court has appeared to
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does not misappropriate a written client list or engage in other
"improper methods," she may compete fiercely with her former
employer."4
While the Virginia Supreme Court is disinclined to restrain
employees in the absence of a clearly drafted non-competition
agreement, the court has demonstrated that it will enforce
covenants that are reasonable in scope, duration and geographic
reach. Thus, a unanimous court found the non-competition
agreement in New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton" rea-
sonable. David Knighton had the highest profile of any of radio
station WPSK's disc jockeys. The Pulaski country music station,
which was owned by New River Media Group, Inc. (New River),
had a signal strength of sixty air miles.'
On the same date New River terminated Knighton's employ-
ment in 1992, the parties entered into a non-competition agree-
ment for the first time. In exchange for $2000, Knighton cove-
nanted that he would not engage in a business that competed
with WPSK within sixty air miles of the broadcast station for
endorse anti-solicitation agreements. Hilb, Rogal and Hamilton Co. v. DePew, 247 Va.
240, 247, 440 S.E.2d 918, 922 (1994); Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 807, 263 S.E.2d 430,
434 (1980) (enforcing fee-splitting agreement with former partner who solicited
partnership's clients). Covenants not to solicit the employer's customers, in contrast to
the conventional non-competition agreement, often lack any geographical restriction.
The absence of a spatial limitation has led a few courts to hold that anti-solicitation
agreements are void for overbreadth. See, e.g., Guffey v. Shelnut & Assocs., 278
S.E.2d 371, 373 (Ga. 1981); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sempetrean, 525 N.E.2d
1016, 1020 (Ill. App. 2d 1988); College Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d
738, 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 314 A.2d 287, 294
(Pa. 1974). For examples of Virginia circuit court decisions holding that anti-solicita-
tion agreements are valid, see McKeever Assocs. v. Giuseppe, 29 Va. Cir. 362, 365
(Fairfax County 1992) and Arrowhead Travel v. Hinton, 25 Va. Cir. 54, 57 (Lancaster
County 1991). For examples of Virginia courts finding anti-solicitation agreements
overbroad and unenforceable, see Kantor v. Martin, Chancery No. 116726, slip op.
(Fairfax County Jan. 15, 1991) and Northern Virginia Psychiatric Group, P.C. v.
Halpern, 19 Va. Cir. 279, 282 (Fairfax County 1990).
140. Peace, 246 Va. at 282, 435 S.E.2d at 135. In reviewing the appropriateness of
injunctive relief against Peace and Dickens, the court considered whether the employ-
ees had used "improper methods" when they solicited Apollo's customers. Id. at 281,
435 S.E.2d at 135. See Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836
(1987) (holding that to establish a prima facie showing of tortious interference with
an at-will contract, the plaintiff must prove the interferer used "improper methods" in
bringing about a termination of contract).
141. 245 Va. 367, 429 S.E.2d 25 (1993).
142. Id. at 369, 429 S.E.2d at 26. Knighton also had extensive management re-
sponsibilities. Id. at 369-70, 429 S.E.2d at 26.
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twelve months. The agreement also provided that New River
would be entitled to injunctive relief in the event Knighton
breached this covenant."
Knighton breached the covenant two weeks later when he
went to work for WPSKs rival, a country music station in near-
by Radford.'" After the Circuit Court of Montgomery County
refused to enjoin Knighton from working at the Radford station,
New River sought appellate review. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the action with
instructions that Knighton be enjoined from competing for
twelve months from the date of the trial court's injunction. 4"
The supreme court had no difficulty finding that the non-com-
petition agreement was "reasonable" under the three-part test
used since 1956 to evaluate the enforceability of non-competi-
tion covenants:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer,
reasonable in the sense that it is no greater than is neces-
sary to protect the employer in some legitimate business in-
terest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint
reasonable in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and
oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a
livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a
sound public policy?14
The court deemed the sixty-mile limit imposed by the covenant
to be reasonable, particularly since it corresponded with
WPSKI's broadcast range. Thus, the agreement was no broader
than necessary to protect the employer's legitimate inter-
ests."'47 The court also found that the relatively brief, twelve-
143. Id. at 368, 429 S.E.2d at 26.
144. Id. Knighton returned the $2000 check to New River when he accepted the
other radio station's offer of employment. Id.
145. Id. at 370, 429 S.E.2d at 27.
146. Id. at 369, 429 S.E.2d at 26. The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted this
three-part test for determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants in Meissel v.
Finley, 198 Va. 577, 580, 95 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1956); accord Blue Ridge Anesthesia v.
Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 371-72, 389 S.E.2d 467, 468-69 (1990); Paramount Termite Con-
trol v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 174, 380 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1989); Roanoke Engineering
Sales v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1982); Richardson v.
Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962).
147. Knighton, 245 Va. at 370, 429 S.E.2d at 26. The court's emphasis upon
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month temporal condition was also reasonable from the perspec-
tive of both Knighton and New River." Finally, nothing in
the agreement trampled upon public policy."
Circuit courts in Virginia during the period under review also
decided challenges by employees to the reasonableness of cove-
nants restricting competition. In Crawley v. Cox," ° for exam-
ple, the Circuit Court of Fredricksburg enforced a covenant not
to compete that prohibited a dentist from practicing within ten
miles of his former office for two years following termination of
his employment. 5' The court rejected the employee's argu-
ment that the two-year limitation was unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to the parties' one-year employment contract. 52 In
Clute v. H & R Block," an employee convinced the Circuit
Court of Wise County to enjoin H & R Block from enforcing a
two-year non-competition covenant. The plaintiff had worked
preparing tax returns for just six weeks before H & R Block
discharged her. Judge Stump ruled that imposing a two-year
restriction upon an employee whom the company fired after
such a brief relationship would be unreasonable." Mean-
while, McKeever & Assocs. v. Giusseppe" involved an agree-
ment not to solicit a former employer's clients for three years
following the conclusion of the employment relationship. Unlike
a conventional covenant not to compete, the anti-solicitation
agreement lacked a geographical restriction. The Circuit Court
Knighton's status as a "valued employee" of the radio station who had "the highest
profile of any of its personalities," Id. at 367, 429 S.E.2d at 26, is consistent with
earlier decisions in which the relatively high status of the employee within the com-
pany was a factor weighing in favor of enforcing a covenant against competition; see
Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 806, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980) (enforcing a non-competi-
tion covenant against a senior partner in an investment firm and stating that "[wie
are not dealing here with employer and employee but with senior partners who stood
upon equal footing at the bargaining table"); Meissel, 198 Va. at 583, 95 S.E.2d at
191 ("In judging whether restrictive provisions are unreasonably harsh and oppressive
on the covenantor, it is relevant to consider the personalities involved as well as the
circumstances of the transaction.").
148. Knighton, 245 Va. at 370, 429 S.E.2d at 26.
149. Id. at 370, 429 S.E.2d at 27.
150. 27 Va. Cir. 188 (Fredricksburg City 1992).
151. Id. at 193.
152. Id. at 192.
153. No. C93-505, slip op. (Wise County Dec. 2, 1993).
154. Id.
155. 29 Va. Cir. 362 (Fairfax County 1992).
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of Fairfax County upheld the agreement, noting that the cove-
nant "did not prevent the [employee] from entering another
business, even a competing one."1"
B. Tort Actions Against Employees
Tort actions by companies against employees guilty of disloy-
alty or improper solicitation of the employer's clients have been
the subject of several instructive decisions in Virginia since
1993.' The supreme court in these opinions has shown a
strong reluctance to deprive plaintiffs of a trial on the merits.
156. Id. at 365.
157. Circuit courts in Virginia have also considered claims by employees against
employers or third parties for tortious interference with a contractual relations in the
last two years. The Circuit Court of the City of Petersburg held that the plaintiff had
successfully pled a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract against
her former employer. Murray v. Cees of Virginia, Inc., 29 Va. Cir. 95 (Petersburg
City 1992). The requisite improper methods consisted of unjustified threats by the
plaintiffs former employer to publicize detrimental information about the plaintiffs
fitness to work for a competing business. Id. at 97. In Jones v. Pembroke Occupation-
al Health, Inc., 26 Va. Cir. 206 (Richmond City 1992), the plaintiff sued a drug test-
ing laboratory for erroneously reporting a test sample as positive to his employer.
The court sustained the laboratory's demurrer to the plaintiffs claim of tortious inter-
ference with an at-will contract, finding that the defendant's conduct, while damaging
to the employee, was not intentional. Id. at 207. None of the supreme court decisions
in this area address the applicable statutes of limitations. In F.D.I.C. v. Cocke, 7
F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1993), however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the one-year, "catch all" limitation period set out in VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1992) applies to claims against a corporate officer or director
for breach of fiduciary duty. 7 F.3d at 402. Accord C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett,
124 B.R. 689, 693 (W.D. Va. 1990); Lavay Corp. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n., 830 F.2d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1987).
While employers have only one year in which to sue disloyal employees for
breach of fiduciary duty, the five-year statute of limitations applicable to injuries to
property, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243B (Repl. Vol. 1992), may govern tortious interfer-
ence with contract claims. In Handley v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 16777-RF (Newport
News City Dec. 2, 1993), the circuit court held that "the applicable statute of limita-
tions for a tortious interference action is five years." Id. at 12. Other courts in Vir-
ginia have reached varying conclusions concerning which statute of limitations applies
to tortious interference with contract claims. See, e.g., Unlimited Screw Products, Inc.
v. Malm, 781 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that a two-year statute of
limitations for injuries to a person applies to a claim for tortious interference with a
contract); Welch v. Kennedy Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc., 63 B.R. 888, 898 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1986) (holding a five-year statute of limitations applicable to tortious inter-
ference with prospective business opportunity); Johnson v. Plaisance, 25 Va. Cir. 264,
266 (Charlottesville City 1991) (applying a one-year, "catch-all" statute of limitations
to a claim for tortious interference with a contract).
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In Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Richmond v. DePew,'1 the
question presented on appeal was whether the employer, a
pension plan administrator, had established a prima facie case
against employees for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy to
interfere with contractual relations and tortious interference
with contract.159 Just prior to resigning from Hilb, Rogal and
Hamilton Company of Richmond ("R"), Edward DePew and
Edward Menster steered at least one of HRB's pension plan cli-
ents toward a competing pension plan business they had recent-
ly established." Soon after their departure from HRB, the
two former employees executed contracts with businesses that
until then had their pension plans administered by HRB under
agreements that were terminable at-will.1
6
'
The Supreme Court of Virginia began its analysis of the
several counts contained in HRB's motion for judgment by con-
firming that the tort of intentional interference with an at-will
contract has four elements: (1) the existence of a valid contrac-
tual relationship; (2) knowledge on the part of the interferer of
that contractual relationship; (3) the use of "improper methods"
in the intentional interference causing a termination of the
contract; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose contract
has been disrupted.162 In Hilb, the only element in question
was the third-the use of "improper methods." The court found
sufficient evidence that the employees had used two improper
methods."
The first improper method, the employees' breach of their
fiduciary duties to HRB, occurred during the employment
relationship." DePew and Menster, while still employed by
HRB, breached their fiduciary duties by attempting to steal the
company's customers. This mischief was tortious in its own
right.'" In addition, the defendants' on-the-job misconduct
satisfied the "improper methods" prong of the four-part test for
158. 247 Va. 240, 440 S.E.2d 918 (1994).
159. Id. at 248-49, 440 S.E.2d at 923.
160. Id. at 243, 440 S.E.2d at 920.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 245-46, 440 S.E.2d at 921 (emphasis in original).
163. Id. at 246, 440 S.E.2d at 922.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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intentional interference with an at-will contract and conspiracy
to interfere.'" In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed
to its decision in Duggin v. Adams..7 that the interferer's
breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a sufficiently improper
method to satisfy the third element of the four-part test for
tortious interference with an at-will contract. 1'
The second "improper method" evident from the record con-
cerned the post-employment activities of DePew and Menster.
Both employees had entered into broadly written non-competi-
tion agreements that, in the court's view, prohibited them from
doing business with HRB's customers for two years following
termination of their employment.'69 By executing contracts
with customers of HIRB, within two years after their resigna-
tions, DePew and Menster breached the non-competition agree-
ment. '7 The employees' violation of this agreement qualified
as an "improper method" under the test for intentional interfer-
ence with at-will contracts articulated in Duggin."'
In keeping with its recent decision in Peace v. Conway,'72
the court held that DePew's execution of these post-termination
contracts with HRB's former customers was not an independent
breach of fiduciary duty.'7' An employee has a fiduciary duty
to refrain from acting adversely to his employer's interests only
during the employment relationship." Thus, the predatory
efforts of DePew and Menster to appropriate HRB's customers
while the defendants remained company employees were action-
able as breaches of the employees' fiduciary duties. 7' Fiducia-
ry obligations, however, end with the employment
relationship. 7'
The supreme court also demonstrated its willingness to up-
166. Id. at 247, 440 S.E.2d at 921.
167. 234 Va. 221, 226-28, 360 S.E.2d 832, 835-37 (1987).
168. Hilb, 247 Va. at 245-46, 440 S.E.2d at 921.
169. Id. at 248, 440 S.E.2d at 923.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 246 Va. 278, 435 S.E.2d 133 (1993).
173. Hilb, 247 Va. at 249, 440 S.E.2d at 923.
174. Id. at 246, 440 S.E.2d at 921. See Greenspan v. Osheroff, 232 Va. 388, 400,
351 S.E.2d 28, 37 (1986).
175. 247 Va. at 246, 440 S.E.2d at 922.
176. Id. at 249, 440 S.E.2d at 923.
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hold tort claims by employers in Catercorp, Inc. v. Catering
Services, Inc.1 17 Like Hilb, Catercorp involved conspiratorial ef-
forts by two employees to circumvent a non-competition cove-
nant and draw their employer's customers to a rival business
they had furtively organized."15 Seeking monetary and injunc-
tive relief, the employer, Catercorp, sued one of the former
employees and a third party for tortious interference with con-
tract, statutory and common law conspiracy to induce the
breach of a contract, and violation of various duties of loyal-
ty 9  The Circuit Court of Hanover County sustained the
defendant's demurrer. However, the supreme court reversed on
appeal"o stating that "[t]his is another case in which a trial
court incorrectly has short-circuited litigation pretrial and has
decided the dispute without permitting the parties to reach a
trial on the merits." 8'
177. 246 Va. 22, 431 S.E.2d 277 (1993).
178. Id. at 26, 431 S.E.2d at 280.
179. Id. at 27, 431 S.E.2d at 281.
180. Id. at 29, 431 S.E.2d at 281.
181. Id. at 24, 431 S.E.2d at 279. Writing for a unanimous bench, Justice Compton
emphasized that the defendant employee had conceded that he, "as an employee at-
will," owed his employer "the duties of good faith and fair dealing during the time
period he was actually employed by the plaintiff" Id. at 28-29, 431 S.E.2d at 282.
The supreme court found the plaintiffs allegations sufficient to state a claim for
"breach of the employment duties that defendants say exist." Id. To the extent that
this amounts to a recognition by the supreme court that employers may sue employ-
ees for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as opposed to a
breach of fiduciary duty, it could prove to be a boon for employees. Courts in at least
ten jurisdictions recognize the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an exception
to the employment at-will rule. These courts point to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 (1979) for the principle that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is implied in all contracts. See Kimberly K. Geariety, Comment, At-Will Employment:
7Tme for Good Faith and Fair Dealing Between Employers and Employees, 28
WILIJAMETTE L. REv. 681 (1992) (surveying case law in ten states which recognize
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing as exceptions to at-will doctrines).
Employees can argue in the wake of Catercorp that if employers have a cause of
action against disloyal at-will employees for breach of this implied covenant, at-will
employees must have a corresponding cause of action when their employers act in
plain bad faith. An argument along these lines even after Catercorp is unlikely to
succeed given Virginia's attachment to the at-will rule. Trial courts applying Virginia
law have consistently declined to recognize a cause of action for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., Sneed v. American Bank Stationery
Co., 764 F. Supp. 65, 67 (W.D. Va. 1991); Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., 625 F.
Supp. 883, 890 (E.D. Va. 1986), affd, 825 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1987); Murray v. Lees,
29 Va. Cir. 95, 96-97 (Petersburg City 1992); Spiller v. James River Corp., No. WL-
2216-3, (Richmond City Dec. 23, 1993); Nichols v. Progress Printing Co., Inc., 24 Va.
Cir. 301, 305 (Campbell County 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Va. 333, 421
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Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n12 is another recent instance
of the supreme court overruling a trial court's decision to sus-
tain a demurrer to a plaintiffs claim of tortious interference
with contractual relations. The plaintiff, Aron Krantz, was a
pilot for Eastern Air Lines who declined to support his union's
strike against the airline." Krantz filed a motion for judg-
ment against the union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
and another pilot, charging that the defendants had spoiled his
prospects for obtaining a job in the airline industry. Krantz
alleged that ALPA had encouraged union members to wage a
disinformation campaign against him, which caused prospective
employers to reject his job applications." The union de-
murred on the ground that the Railway Labor Act" preempt-
ed Krantz's state law tort claim. The Circuit Court of Fairfax
County agreed and dismissed Krantz's suit."
The supreme court reversed, holding that the plaintiff had
pled a cause of action that was not preempted by the Railway
Labor Act.' Federal labor statutes, the court acknowledged,
may well proscribe blacklisting in retaliation for employees'
refusal to support a strike.1" The court also recognized that a
plaintiff who asserts a federally protected right is limited to
remedies available under federal law for a violation of that
right."9 Krantz, however, as a mere applicant for employ-
ment, had no federally protected right. Particularly since
Krantz had no remedy under federal law, Justice Whiting
wrote, Virginia courts should allow him to enforce his common
law rights."9°
S.E.2d 428 (1993); Schryer v. VBR, 25 Va. Cir. 464, 468 (Fairfax County 1991). But
see Keiler v. Valley Proteins, Inc., 25 Va. Cir. 548, 550 (Fairfax County 1989) (over-
ruling a demurrer to a claim based on a breach of an implied promise of good faith
and fair dealing in a contract of employment for a specific number of years).
182. 245 Va. 202, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993).
183. Id. at 204, 427 S.E.2d at 327.
184. Id. at 204-05, 427 S.E.2d at 327-28.
185. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
186. 245 Va. at 208-09, 427 S.E.2d at 329-30.
187. Id. at 209, 427 S.E.2d at 330.
188. Id. at 208, 427 S.E.2d at 329. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(bX1XA), (bX2) (1988).
189. 245 Va. at 208-09, 427 S.E.2d at 329-30.
190. Id. at 209, 427 S.E.2d at 330. The Circuit Court of King George County also
considered a pre-emption defense in Walker v. White Packing Co., Inc.-Virginia, 31
Va. Cir. 220 (King George County 1993). The plaintiff sued under VA. CODE ANN. §
65.2-308 (Repl. Vol. 1991), which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee
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Perhaps through oversight, the Krantz Court held that the
test adopted in Chaves v. Johnson9 for intentional interfer-
ence with a contract applied to the pilot's claim for intentional
interference with a prospective contract. 92 Under Chaves, the
plaintiff need not allege that the defendant used "improper
methods" to interfere with her contract. In other decisions,
however, the court has held that the use of "improper methods"
by the interferer is an essential element of the tort of inter-
ference with a prospective contract.193 After Krantz, plaintiffs
can argue that they need allege only the Chaves elements
without also asserting that the defendant's methods were "im-
for filing a workers' compensation claim. The plaintiff also sued under VA. CODE ANN.
§ 51.5-41 (Repi. Vol. 1991), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
a disability. The employer argued that these claims were pre-empted by section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) because the plaintiff was
a member of a union which had a collective bargaining contract with the employer.
Walker, 31 Va. Cir. at 224. The circuit court, applying Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic
Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988), held that neither claim was pre-empted by federal law,
because neither required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Walker,
31 Va. Cir. at 224. In a subsequent letter opinion, Judge Haley also held that the
plaintiffs claims for retaliatory discharge and disability discrimination are not subject
to arbitration provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the
union and her employer. Walker v. White Packing Company, Inc., Ch. No. 93000088,
slip op. at 3 (King George County Feb. 16, 1994).
191. 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985). In Chaves, the court adopted the
following test for tortious interference with contract:
(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectan-
cy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the
interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage
to the party whose relationship or expectancy had been disrupted.
Id.
192. 245 Va. at 206, 427 S.E.2d at 328.
193. Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1984);
see also Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987) (citing
Allen Realty for the proposition that a "cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective contract arises when interference is both intentional and improper.")
In a case factually similar to Krantz, Belefia v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 31 Va. Cir. 413
(Fairfax County 1993), the Circuit Court of Fairfax County considered whether the
plaintiffs had pled a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective con-
tractual relations. "Where a plaintiff seeks recovery for interference with a prospective
contract," Judge Annunziata remarked, "plaintiff must demonstrate both an intention-
al interference and interference which was improper." Id. at 414. The Belefia plaintiffs
were recalcitrant members of the ALPA who accused the union of interfering with
their bids to work for various air lines. Id. at 413-14. The union's techniques included
threats of reprisal against the plaintiffs potential employers, methods that the circuit
court found sufficiently improper to overcome the union's demurrer. Id. at 416.
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proper" to state a cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective contractual relations.
III. CONCLUSION
Both employers and employees can point to gains in the
recent developments outlined above. Whether viewed from the
perspective of the employer or employee, the judicial opinions
reviewed here suggest that the most dynamic area of Virginia
employment law is in tort. Implied contract actions premised on
personnel memoranda, handbooks, or remarks made in passing
by supervisors hold little promise for discharged workers. Yet
Lockhart and Middlekauf represent stunning achievements in
tort for workers. Employers, too, have made important advances
in tort actions during the past year. Catercorp and Hilb clarify
and expand the tort remedies available to employers preyed
upon by disloyal employees, and former employees who violate
non-competition covenants. These and other recent decisions in-
crease the value of non-competition agreements to employers.
An employee who flouts a well-drafted non-competition covenant
can now be sued in tort for intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, as well as in contract for breach of the agree-
ment not to compete.
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